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CAN I BUY YOUR LAWSUIT? A PROPOSED
SOLUTION TO THE UNSTATED PROBLEM IN GULF
INSURANCE CO. V. COTTONE
NEIL R. BELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
New Mexico's system of pure comparative negligence harbors a disparity that
can create an obstacle for parties who wish to settle their lawsuit. Parties have a
right that can aid them in reaching a settlement when the defendant is jointly and
severally liable that has no analog when the defendant is severally liable.
Specifically, in a multiple tortfeasor scenario, a jointly and severally liable
defendant can settle with a plaintiff for the whole of the plaintiff s damages and can
then sue the defendant's fellow tortfeasors for contribution.' In that situation, as
long as the plaintiff's claims against the other tortfeasors are "extinguished" by the
settlement, the defendant can sue the other tortfeasors for their fair shares of the
plaintiff s damages.2 In essence, when the plaintiff is willing, a jointly and severally
liable defendant has the right to buy the plaintiffs claims against the other
tortfeasors for the price of the settlement.
A severally liable defendant, however, has no corresponding right to buy the
plaintiff s claims. If a severally liable defendant settles for more than his expected
share of the plaintiff's damages, the court will label him a mere "volunteer" and
dismiss any attempted recovery from a fellow tortfeasor.' The result is a liability
scheme that leaves a plaintiff and a severally liable defendant without a valuable
bargaining tool when they reach an impasse in settlement negotiations. 4 This
asymmetry in New Mexico's current liability scheme is arguably a "structural fault"
that should be addressed because it can create obstacles for parties who wish to
settle.5
GulfInsurance Co. v. Cottone6 illustrated this problem and presented a situation
where the original plaintiff and defendant would have benefited from the creation
of a right for the severally-liable defendant to buy the plaintiff s claims against the
other tortfeasors. In Cottone, it appeared that the plaintiff wanted to conclude her
* The author would like to thank his wife, Kirsten, for her boundless patience throughout the course of
this project, and Professor M.E. Occhialino for always making time to listen and to offer his valuable insight and
encouragement.
1. See NMSA 1978, § 41-3-2(B) (1987) ("A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for
contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro rata share
thereof.").
2. See id. § 41-3-2(C) (1987) ("A joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the injured person is
not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not
extinguished by the settlement.").
3. See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150,1 13,148 P.3d 814,819 (stating that the severally liable
defendant's choice to settle the whole of the plaintiffs claims was "by definition-a voluntary act").
4. Reaching a settlement is even more difficult when the nature of the defendant's liability is unclear, i.e.,
whether his liability will be several orjoint and several. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. In that situation,
the defendant is unlikely to settle for more than his fair share of the plaintiff s damages because of the uncertainty
about whether he will be able to seek contribution from the other tortfeasors after the settlement.
5. See Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 13, 148 P.3d at 819 (stating that it would take a "structural fault" in
New Mexico's system of pure comparative negligence to justify the severally liable defendant's recovery of
contribution).
6. 2006-NMCA-150, 148 P.3d 814.
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case quickly, and that the defendant was willing to settle for the entirety of her
damages and to pursue her claims against the other tortfeasors. However, there was
no mechanism for doing so because the defendant was severally liable. This case
note advocates that defendants should have the ability to settle the entirety of the
plaintiff's claims and to sue the remaining tortfeasors for their fair share of the
plaintiff's damages, irrespective of the nature of the settling defendant's liability.
This note presents two approaches that would allow a severally liable defendant
to buy a plaintiffs claims against the other tortfeasors in a multiple tortfeasor
scenario. New Mexico law could allow the plaintiff to contractually assign her
causes of action against the other tortfeasors to the settling defendant, or
alternatively, it could permit the settling defendant to subrogate to the plaintiffs
claims against the other tortfeasors. Either approach would give the parties the
freedom to do in a several liability situation what is already allowed by statute when
the defendant is jointly and severally liable.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Rogelio Sarinana was driving a tanker truck filled with liquid carbon dioxide
through an intersection in Roosevelt County when he collided with another vehicle.7
Due to the collision, carbon dioxide began leaking from the truck and created a
cloud around the accident scene that inhibited visibility "on an already foggy day."8
A seven car pile-up ensued.9 Michael Cottone (Cottone), the first motorist to
confront the accident scene, drove into the cloud, collided with something, and
stopped his vehicle in the middle of the road.' 0 Elizabeth Rapp (Rapp) then drove
into the cloud and collided with Cottone's car. Moments later, Rapp's rear window
shattered when another vehicle collided with hers after being rear-ended as it
approached the scene." By the time the collision was over, an additional three
vehicles joined the pile-up.' 2 After her window broke, Rapp got out of her car,
directly exposing herself to the liquid carbon dioxide and receiving severe bums. 3
Though there were seven other drivers involved in the collision, Rapp sued only
Richard Lobrado (Lobrado), the owner of the tanker truck that was involved in the
accident.' 4 Lobrado's insurer, Gulf Insurance Co. (Gulf), did not attempt tojoin any
of the other drivers in Rapp's lawsuit but instead settled with Rapp for $1.7
million. 5 The settlement agreement released Gulf and Lobrado from all further
liability 6 but did not release the other drivers.' 7 Gulf then brought suit against the
other six drivers in an effort to recoup some of its payment to Rapp under the theory

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. 3, 148 P.3d at 816.
Id.
Id. 14, 148 P.3d at 816.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 5, 148 P.3d at 817.
Id. - 3, 5, 148 P.3d at 816, 817.
Id. 15, 148 P.3d at 817.
Id.
See id 1 27, 148 P.3d at 822.
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that it was subrogated to Rapp's claims against them.18 The district court dismissed
Gulfs claims against each of the other drivers with prejudice. 9
Gulf appealed, arguing that it was entitled to seek damages from the other drivers
based on its original theory that it was subrogated to Rapp' s claims against them.20
Gulf also argued in the alternative that it could either (1) seek contribution from the
other drivers because Gulf was jointly and severally liable with them, or (2) sue the
other drivers because Rapp had assigned her claims against them to Gulf when she
entered into the settlement agreement. 2'The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected
each of Gulf s arguments and affirmed the district court's dismissal.22
Cottone revealed the difficulties experienced by a defendant caught in the web
of New Mexico's system of comparative negligence. On the surface, Cottone was
about a defendant that mistakenly assumed that it could pay the entirety of the
plaintiffs damages and subrogate to her claims against the other tortfeasors.23
However, the case also brought to light a problem created by the asymmetry of New
Mexico's system of comparative negligence. If Lobrado were jointly and severally
liable with the other drivers, Gulf would have had a statutory right to settle with
Rapp for the whole of her damages and then seek proportional contribution from the
other tortfeasors.24 In other words, Gulf could have bought Rapp's claims against
the other drivers for the amount of the settlement. The Cottone court, however,
demonstrated to Gulf that a severally liable defendant has no corresponding right
to buy a plaintiffs claims.25
It should be noted at the outset that Rapp and Gulf did not make it clear in their
settlement agreement that they intended to settle the whole of Rapp' s damages.2 6 As
a result, the Cottone court unquestionably reached the correct result by denying
Gulf s recovery. However, if a similar situation arose in the future where the parties
clearly stated their intent to settle the entirety of the plaintiff s damages, the Cottone
opinion would stand as a barrier to the severally liable defendant's recovery from
the other tortfeasors. This situation calls out for a solution.
I. BACKGROUND
To understand the Cottone court's holding and to better evaluate the alternative
solutions posed below, this section will provide the legal context of the Cottone
decision. Specifically, this section will summarize New Mexico's law of pure
comparative negligence, assignment of personal injury claims, and subrogation.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
See
See
See
See

5, 148 P.3d at 817.
6, 148 P.3d at 817.
id. 31, 148 P.3d at 823.
id. 5, 148 P.3d at 817.
infra Part M.A.
Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 13, 148 P.3d at 819; see also infra Part ILA.
Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 1 27, 148 P.3d at 822.
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A. New Mexico's System of Pure Comparative Negligence
With its decision in Scott v. Rizzo, the New Mexico Supreme Court abolished the
doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of a system of pure comparative
negligence.27 On the heels of the Scott decision, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
in Bartlettv. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc.,28 used the rationale underlying the adoption of comparative negligence to abolish the doctrine of joint and several liability
for concurrent tortfeasors.2 9 Five years later, the New Mexico Legislature codified
the Bartlett decision3" with the passage of section 41-3A-1 of the New Mexico
Statutes,3 which abolished the doctrine of joint and several liability in all but four
scenarios.3' The result was the liability system that New Mexico has in place today33
in which a defendant is presumptively liable only for the portion of the plaintiff s
total damages that corresponds to that defendant's percentage of fault.34
When the Legislature codified Bartlett,it passed two additional provisions that
are of particular importance to this case note because they affect the rights of a
settling party based on the nature of that party's liability. First, section 41-3A-1 (E)
states that a party who is severally liable cannot seek contribution "from any other
person," nor can he seek to reduce his liability based on the amount of payment
made by a fellow tortfeasor to the plaintiff. 35 Under this statute, a severally-liable
party who settles with the plaintiff is presumed to pay only his share of the
27. 96 N.M. 682,690,634 P.2d 1234,1242 (1981) (adopting pure comparative negligence and holding that
"[plure comparative negligence denies recovery for one's own fault; it permits recovery to the
extent of another's
fault; and it holds all parties fully responsible for their own respective acts to the degree that those acts have caused
harm").
28. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982).
29. Id. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585 (abolishing joint and several liability, holding "[f]aimess dictates that the
blameworthiness of all actors in an incident be treated on a consistent basis").
30. See Andrew G. Schultz & M.E. Occhialino, StatutoryAdoption of Several Liability in New Mexico:
A Comnentary and Quasi-LegislativeHistory, 18 N.M. L. REV. 483, 484 (1988).
31. NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-1 (1987).
32. Id. § 41-3A-1(C) (stating that joint and several liability shall apply "(1) to any person or persons who
acted with the intention of inflicting injury or damage; (2) to any persons whose relationship to each other would
make one person vicariously liable for the acts of the other, but only to that portion of the total liability attributed
to those persons; (3) to any persons strictly liable for the manufacture and sale of a defective product, but only to
that portion of the total liability attributed to those persons; or (4) to situations not covered by any of the foregoing
and having a sound basis in public policy").
33. Since the Legislature codified Bartlett, the courts have added two major exceptions to New Mexico's
several liability scheme. The first occurred with the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Saiz v. Belen School
Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102 (1992). There, the court invoked the public policy exception to section 41-3A1(C) to create the doctrine of "inherently dangerous activity." See id. at 395, 827 P.2d at 110. Under the doctrine,
the employer of an independent contractor is jointly and severally liable if he hires the contractor to perform work
that would create a "peculiar risk of harm" to others if the work were done without taking reasonable precautions
and if those precautions were in fact not taken. See id.; see also M.E. Occhialino, Bartlett Revisited: New Mexico
Tort Law Twenty YearsAfter the Abolition ofJointand SeveralLiability-PartOne, 33 N.M. L. REv. 1,37 (2003).
The inherently dangerous activity doctrine is the only exception to several liability that the courts have created thus
far using the public policy exception of the statute. See Occhialino, supra, at 37.
The second exception to several liability, termed successive tortfeasor liability, arose with the New
Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. HealthsouthRehabilitationCorp., 120 N.M. 422, 426, 902 P.2d
1025, 1029 (1995) (adopting successive tortfeasor liability in New Mexico). Under successive tortfeasor liability,
an individual who causes a foreseeable enhanced injury that is causally distinct from the original injury is jointly
and severally liable with the original tortfeasor for the enhanced injury. See id.
34. See NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-I(B) (1987) (defining several liability).
35. This provision codified the New Mexico Court of Appeals' ruling in Wilson v. Gait, 100 N.M. 227,668
P.2d 1104 (Ct. App. 1983). See Schultz & Occhialino, supra note 30, at 496.
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plaintiff s damages.36 Furthermore, the settlement does not affect the liability of any
other tortfeasors who are severally liable to the plaintiff for the same injury."7
By contrast, section 41-3-2(C) states that a party who is jointly and severally
liable may settle for more than his share of the plaintiffs damages and seek
contribution from any other tortfeasor whose liability is "extinguished" by the
settlement agreement.38 Thus, a party who is jointly and severally liable has a
statutory right to contribution so long as he secures from the plaintiff a release of
liability for his fellow tortfeasors.39
B. The Law of Assignment of PersonalInjury Claims in New Mexico
New Mexico courts define an assignment as "a transfer of property or some other
right from one person (the assignor) to another (the assignee)."' Using an
assignment, a creditor can assign to a third person a debt that the creditor is owed.4 1
The debtor must then pay the assignee-not the original creditor-if the assignee
gives notice to the debtor of the assignment.4 2 If the debtor pays the original creditor
after receiving such notice, it does so "at43its peril, because the assignee may enforce
its rights against the [debtor] directly.
The practice of the assignment of choses in action' has long been a controversial
one.45 The early common law prohibited the assignment of legal claims altogether.4 6
Over time, however, exceptions to the categorical prohibition were created in the
commercial context, but the assignment of personal injury claims remained
forbidden.4 7
Currently, there are three approaches relating to the assignment of personal
injury claims. 48 Some jurisdictions continue to categorically prohibit such assignments while others place no restrictions on them. 49 There is a middle approach that
distinguishes between the assignment of personal injury claims and the assignment

36. See NMSA 1978, § 41-3A-l(E).
37. See id.
38. Id. § 41-3-2(C).
39. See id.
40. Quality Chiropractic, P.C. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 2002-NMCA-080, 6, 51 P.3d 1172, 1175
(ellipsis omitted).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. This describes exactly what the plaintiff in Quality Chiropracticattempted to do. See id. 4,51 P.3d
at 1175.
44. A chose in action is "[a] proprietary right in personam, such as a debt owed by another person, a share
in a joint-stock company, or a claim for damages in tort." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 258 (8th ed. 2004).
8-12, 51 P.3d at 1176-77.
45. See Quality Chiropractic,2002-NMCA-080,
46. Id. 8, 51 P.3d at 1176.
47. The primary reason for the continued prohibition against the assignment of personal injury claims was
the potential for the "unscrupulous trafficking in litigation as a commodity," termed champerty and maintenance.
Id. 10, 51 P.3d at 1176. The former is "the intermeddling of a stranger in the litigation of another, for profit"
while the latter is "the financing of such intermeddling." Id. While these practices originally centered around landbased disputes, the names adhered to the practices of buying and financing legal claims. See id.
1, 51 P.3d at 1177.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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of the proceeds from personal injury claims.5 ° In those jurisdictions, the former is
still prohibited; the latter is not.51
The law relating to the assignment of personal injury claims in New Mexico is
unclear. Few cases have directly addressed the question of whether personal injury
claims are assignable.52 One line of cases, beginning with Motto v. State Farm
MutualAutomobile InsuranceCo.,53 held that "in a personal injury case an injured
person may assign his cause of action. ' 54 Despite this sweeping language, however,
the reach of the Motto rule is arguably quite short. The Motto line of cases
recognized the right of assignment solely in the context of an insured assigning his
cause of action to his insurer through a subrogation clause." Additionally, the Motto
rule was premised on the existence of a statutory right to assign personal injury
claims through a subrogation clause. 6 A further limitation is that the courts have
inconsistently construed that statute as granting either a right of assignment or of
reimbursement. 7 As a result, even the narrow right of assignment recognized in the
Motto line of cases is of questionable validity.58
The case that has most thoroughly dealt with the assignability of personal injury
claims is Quality Chiropractic,PC v. FarmersInsurance Co. ofArizona.59 In that

50. Id.
51. The plaintiff in Quality Chiropracticargued for the third option, but the court rejected the argument.
See id9J 13, 26, 51 P.3d at1177, 1181.
52. A "trio
of early New Mexico decisions" referenced the traditional
common law rule that the assignment
of personal injury claims is prohibited. Id. 8,51 P.3d at1176 (citing Young v.N.M. Broad.Co., 60 N.M.475,
479,292 P.2d 776, 779 (1956); Parker v.Beasley, 40 N.M.68, 79,54 P.2d 687, 693-94 (1936); Kandelin v.Lee
Moor Contracting Co., 37 N.M.479, 490, 24 P.2d 731, 737 (1933)). These cases, however, did not address the
issue directly. See Young, 60 N.M. at 479, 292 P.2d at 779 ("Generally, a right of action for purely personal tort
is not assignable before judgment, but the validity of the assignment is unimportant, as it did not purport to assign
a cause of action."); Parker,40 N.M. at 70, 54 P.2d at 689 ("The general rule now is that choses in action are
assignable, the few exceptions are those for personal wrongs and contracts of a personal nature involving
confidence, skill, and others of like nature."); Kandelin, 37 N.M. at 490, 24 P.2d at 737 ("As a general rule, a right
of action for a tort purely personal, in the absence of statute, is not subject to assignment before judgment. Such
are causes of action for injuries to the person.").
53. 81 N.M. 35,462 P.2d 620 (1969).
54. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Kurth, 96 N.M. 631,634 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Ct. App. 1980).
55. See Motto, 81 N.M. at 37, 462 P.2d at 622 (holding that, based on the validity of a section of the
Workman's Compensation Act (WCA) which creates a statutory right of assignment of personal injury claims to
an insurer through subrogation, non-WCA personal injury claims are also assignable to an insurer through
subrogation); see also Jacobson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 N.M. 280, 282, 491 P.2d 168, 170 (1971)
(citing Motto for the proposition that personal injury claims are assignable under New Mexico law with "respect
to personal injury claims"); Seaboard,96 N.M. at 634, 633 P.2d at 1232 (citing Motto for the proposition that "in
a personal injury case an injured person may assign his cause of action").
56. See Worker's Compensation Act, NMSA 1978, § 52-5-17(B) (1990) (stating "the receipt of
compensation from the employer shall operate as an assignment to the employer or his insurer, guarantoror
surety of any cause of action...") (emphasis added).
57. Compare Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Salgado, 2005-NMCA-144, 2, 125 P.3d 664, 666 (holding
"[c]onsistently with our case law, we conclude Section 52-5-17 only provides a right to seek reimbursement..."),
with Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sydow, 107 N.M. 104, 105, 753 P.2d 350, 351 (1988) (construing the WCA as
granting an assignment, holding "[w]hen the worker recovers the entire amount from the employer, he has assigned
to his employer the right to further recover from third parties for the same injury").
58. See Quality Chiropractic, P.C. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 2002-NMCA-080, 15, 51 P.3d 1172,1178
("questionfing] the premise on which the [Motto] Court reached this conclusion [that personal injury claims are
assignable]" because the WCA has been "consistently construed as.. .granting an employer a right of
reimbursement, not an assignment" and therefore holding that the assignment of personal injury claims is
prohibited by New Mexico common law).
59. Id.
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case the plaintiff sought to enforce a contract that assigned to it the proceeds of a
patient's personal injury claim in return for the promise of medical services to the
patient.' ° Despite notice of the assignment, the defendant insurance company settled
with the patient directly. 6' The plaintiff sued, claiming that the assignment was valid
under New Mexico law and that the plaintiff, as the assignee, could "enforce its
rights against the [debtor] directly., 62 The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendant.63
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that New Mexico should at least allow for the
assignment of the proceeds of personal injury claims.64 After declining to recognize
a distinction between the assignment of the proceeds of a personal injury claim and
of the claim itself,65 the unanimous Court of Appeals surveyed the development of
the law of New Mexico in this area.66 The court relied on "a trio of early New
Mexico decisions" for the proposition that the assignment of personal injury claims
is prohibited under New Mexico common law.67 The court then had to decide
whether to extend the "broad language" of the Motto line of cases-which hold that
personal injury claims are assignable 6 -beyond the subrogation context of those
decisions. The court chose not to do so and instead limited those cases to their
facts. 69 The court held that the assignment of personal injury claims is prohibited

60. Id. 4, 51 P.3d at 1175.
61. Id. 3, 51 P.3d at 1175.
62. Id. 6,51 P.3dat 1175.
63. Id. 4,51 P.3dat 1175.
64. Id. 13,51P.3d at 1177.
65. Id. 12, 51 P.3d at 1177.
66. See id. R 13-17, 51 P.3d at 1177-78.
67. See supra note 52.
68. See supra note 55.
69. See Quality Chiropractic,2002-NMCA-080, 32, 51 P.3d at 1182. To achieve this result, the court
first discounted Motto's rationale stating "we must question the premise on which the [Motto] Court reached this
conclusion [that personal injury claims are assignable]." Id. 15, 51 P.3d at 1178. According to the court, the
provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act (WCA) upon which the Motto court based its assertion that New
Mexico law allowed for the assignment of personal injury claims has been "consistently construed as.. granting
an employer a right of reimbursement, not an assignment." Id. Thus, the court implied that if Motto's holding
permitting the assignment of personal injury claims was based on the WCA, that holding was incorrect because
the courts have construed the Act as a reimbursement statute despite the plain language of the act granting an
assignment. See supra note 57.
Then, with the validity of Motto's holding called into question, the Quality Chiropracticcourt focused
its sights on the holding in Seaboard:
[C]iting Motto for the proposition that personal injury claims are assignable,the SeaboardFire
& Marine InsuranceCo. Court held that the worker could grant the employer an assignment in
his personal injury claim.. .not recogniz[ing] that, had the Motto court been correct in asserting
that the WCA created a right of assignment, the employer would not need an assignment from
the worker.
Quality Chiropractic,2002-NMCA-080, 16, 51 P.3d at 1178 (alteration in original).
With the clear rule of Motto and Seaboardthus marginalized, the court maintained that personal injury claims
have always been prohibited by New Mexico common law. See id. 36, 51 P.3d at 1183. According to the court,
notwithstanding the "broad language" in Motto and Seaboard "addressing the right of assignment in personal
injury cases, those cases involved only the rights of subrogation, and we do not read them as addressing the
enforceability of assignments." Id. 1 32, 51 P.3d at 1182. The court chose instead to "read those cases as creating
an exception to the common law rule prohibiting the assignment of personal injury claims, not as abrogating the
rule altogether." Id.
In sum, the Quality Chiropracticcourt held that personal injury claims have always been prohibited under New
Mexico common law, and it "reject[ed] any distinction between an assignment of the proceeds of a claim and an
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under New Mexico common law and declined to make a public policy exception for
the assignment of future proceeds of personal injury claims.7 °
In support of its decision to limit Motto's pro-assignment rule to the subrogation
context, the Court of Appeals noted six distinctions between the practices of
subrogation and the general assignment of personal injury claims.7 According to
the court, these differences support the right to subrogation and counsel against a
departure from the traditional rule of anti-assignment.72 Quality Chiropracticwas
the last word on the assignability of personal injury claims before the New Mexico
Court of Appeals decided Cottone.
C. The Law of Subrogation in New Mexico
Subrogation is an equitable remedy with roots extending "to the English common
law and to the Roman civil law."73 The modem incarnation of subrogation,
however, has remained largely unchanged for hundreds of years.74 One
commentator defines subrogation as "a legal fiction through which the subrogee,
who is not a volunteer or wrongdoer, pays the debt or discharges the obligation of
the subrogor and is substituted to all the rights and remedies of the subrogor. ' '75 For
a subrogation claim to be valid, "[t]he debt or obligation is one that in good
conscience and fairness should be paid by the tortfeasor. ' '76 When a person is
subrogated to the rights of another, he or she "has no greater rights than the insured,
for one cannot acquire by subrogation what another, whose rights he or she claims,
did not have. ' ' 77 Traditionally, a right of subrogation arises "in one of three ways:
1) An agreement between the insurer and the insured[;] 2) A right created by
statute [;or] 3) The judicial device of equity. 78
While few New Mexico cases deal substantively with the nature of subrogation,
the contours of the law itself are well established. 79 "In New Mexico, an insurer
who pays the claim of its insured under an.. .insurance policy is deemed to be
subrogated by operation of law to recovery of its payments against the person who
caused the loss. ' OThis is "[t]he most common instance of subrogation recognized
by New Mexico law." 81 In such a situation, if the insured brings a lawsuit against
assignment of the claim itself." Id. 36, 51 P.3d at 1183. It saw no reason to abrogate the prohibition either in
whole or in part. See id.
70. Id. 33,51 P.3dat 1182.
71. See infra note 168.
72. See Quality Chiropractic,2002-NMCA-080, 32, 51 P.3d at 1182.
73. M. L. Marasinghe, An HistoricalIntroduction to the Doctrine of Subrogation: The Early History of
the Doctrine1, 10 VAL. U. L. REv. 45 (1975).
74. See id. at 49 (citing Simpson v. Thompson, 3 App. Cas. 279 (1877)).
75. 23 ERIc MILLS HOLMES, HoLMEs' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D, § 141.1 (2003).

76. Id.
77. 16 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 222:5 (2005) (citation omitted).
78. Id.§ 222:6.
79. The majority of New Mexico cases that decide issues related to subrogation are concerned with
procedural matters. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 101 N.M. 148, 150,679 P.2d 816,
818 (1984) (holding that when a subrogated insurer is joined as a party to a jury trial, "the fact of the insurer's
joinder is not to be disclosed to the jury").
80. Id. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817.
81. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Cottone, 2006-NMCA- 150, 1 9, 148 P.3d 814, 818. The opinion also mentions that "[a)
variant of insurer/insured subrogation is applied in the suretyship context." Id. That variant is unrelated to this
article.
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the tortfeasor, the insurer is deemed an indispensable party. 2 Alternatively, after
paying out benefits to its insured, the insurer can bring suit in the name of its
insured by "step[ping] into the shoes of the insured and collect[ing] what [the
insured] has paid from the wrongdoer. 8 3 The right of subrogation arises because
of "a pre-existing duty [of the insurer] to pay out benefits to its insured." 4
New Mexico's rationale for allowing subrogation rests "upon the relationship of
the parties and upon equitable principles, for the purpose of accomplishing the
substantial ends of justice. 8 5 Specifically, the equitable remedy of subrogation "is
for the benefit of one secondarily liable who has paid the debt of another and to
whom in equity and good conscience should be assigned the rights and remedies of
the original creditor."86
IV. RATIONALE
A. Assignment of PersonalInjury Claims
The Cottone court rejected Gulf's argument that, through the release, Rapp had
assigned to Gulf "all of her rights" including "an assignment of all her claims
against Defendants. 8 ' First, because the release named only Gulf and Lobrado, the
court held that Rapp retained her right to sue the other drivers.8 8 Because Rapp had
not released the other drivers from liability, she "did not assign claims against
[them] and did not assign any rights whatsoever, including rights, if any, of
subrogation or contribution."89
Additionally, the Court rejected Gulf's argument that it could sue the other
drivers because the release met the requirements of NMSA 1978, section 41-32(C). 90 That statute would allow Gulf to sue the other drivers for contribution if
Lobrado were jointly and severally liable.9' However, because the Court held that
92
Lobrado was only severally liable, the statute was inapplicable.
Perhaps most importantly, the court held that even if the release had properly
named the other drivers and had thus released them from liability, Rapp could not
have assigned her claims to Gulf because doing so would be contrary to the holding

82. See Safeco, 101 N.M. at 149, 679 P.2d at 817.

83. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 120 N.M. 523, 527, 903 P.2d 834, 838 (1995).
84. Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 1 9, 148 P.3d at 818 (quoting Quality Chiropractic, P.C. v. Farmers Ins.
Co. of Ariz., 2002-NMCA-080,1 21, 51 P.3d 1172, 1179).
85. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 120 N.M. at 527, 903 P.2d at 838.
86. United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Raton Natural Gas Co., 86 N.M. 160,162,521 P.2d 122,124 (1974)
(quoting Fid. & Deposit Co. v. Atherton, 47 N.M. 443, 446, 144 P.2d 157, 160 (1943)).
87. See Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 26, 148 P.3d at 822.

88. Id. 27, 148 P.3d at 822 (citing Hansen v. FordMotor Co., 120 N.M. 203, 211, 900 P.2d 952, 960
(1995) (holding that "a general release raises a rebuttable presumption that only those persons specifically
designated by name or by some other specific identifying terminology are discharged")).
89. See id.

90. NMSA 1978, § 41-3-2(C) (1987) (stating that "[a] joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with the
injured person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured
person is not extinguished by the settlement").
91. See Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 29, 148 P.3d at 822.
92. See id. (holding that Lobrado and the other drivers were concurrent and not successive tortfeasors, and
therefore, joint and several liability does not apply).
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93 According to the Court, that case serves as a complete bar
in Quality Chiropractic.
to the assignment of personal injury claims.94

B. Subrogation
In rejecting Gulf's assertion that it was subrogated to Rapp's claims against the
other drivers, the Cottone court focused on the lack of a pre-existing duty owed by
Gulf to Rapp.95 The court held that "Gulf offers a wholly new variant to New
Mexico law: subrogation between the insurer of a tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's
victim."96 According to the court, one of the defining features of a relationship that
supports subrogation is the insurer's "contractual obligation to compensate its
insured for damages caused by third parties."97 Because
Gulf owed no such
98
inappropriate.
held
was
subrogation
Rapp,
to
obligation
The court also raised New Mexico's adoption of pure comparative fault as a
barrier to Gulf's asserted right to subrogation.9 9 In the court's view, Gulf s attempt
to sue the other drivers amounted to an attempt to make an end-run around New
Mexico's system of pure comparative negligence.'0° "Firmly entrenched as
comparative negligence is, we would do well to require a compelling showing of
equitable need-perhaps a demonstration of a structural fault in the system-to
allow deviation from it."'O' Because Gulf alleged no such "structural fault," the
court refused to "change the basic assumption of several liability in order to
accommodate what would have to be considered-by definition-a voluntary act
on Gulf s part." 0 2 Again, absent a pre-existing obligation to Rapp, the court refused
to validate Gulf's attempt at subrogation.' 13
V. ANALYSIS
A. Assignment of PersonalInjury Claims
While the Cottone court relied heavily on Quality Chiropractic'santi-assignment
rule in denying Gulf s assertion that Rapp had assigned to it her personal injury
claims, the other two related issues addressed in that portion of the opinion also
merit discussion.
Notably, the court used the absence of a release of the other drivers' liability to
bar Gulf's claims, which suggests that the court failed to grasp the inherent
differences between contribution and subrogation. If Gulf werejointly and severally
liable, the court was correct that Gulf could sue the other drivers for contribution

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id. 28, 148 P.3d at 822.
See supra Part IllB.
See Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150,
See id.
Id.
Id. 1 11, 148 P.3d at 818.
Id. 12, 148 P.3d at 818-19.
See id. 1 13, 148 P.3d at 819.

101.

Id.

102. Id.
103. See id.

10, 148 P.3d at 818.
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only if Rapp had explicitly released them from liability.'° However, the court failed
to mention that the only way that Gulf's asserted right to subrogation could exist is
if Rapp had not released the other drivers from liability and thus maintained a right
to which Gulf could subrogate. °5 Subrogation operates on the assumption that the
original plaintiff retained her causes of action." Otherwise, there would be no
claim for the insurer to "step into the shoes of its insured" and sue. 0 7 As a result,
to the extent that the opinion relies on Rapp's continued right to sue the other
drivers as a bar to Gulf's subrogation claim, the court is incorrect.
1. Effect of Quality Chiropractic
The Cottone court's reliance on Quality Chiropractic'santi-assignment rule' s
posed the biggest obstacle to Gulf's assertion that Rapp had assigned to it her
claims against the other drivers.1 °9 The most obvious question raised by the court's
reliance on Quality Chiropracticis whether that case's rule is applicable to the facts
of Cottone."0

In support of its decision to limit the "broad language" of the pro-assignment rule
of the Motto line of cases to the subrogation context,"' the Quality Chiropractic
court focused on how the assignment of personal injury claims is distinguishable
from subrogation to personal injury claims." 2 However, the court did so in the
context of the facts of Quality Chiropracticwhere the plaintiff was "a creditor who
sought a better guarantee of payment by demanding that the patient grant an

104. See NMSA 1978, § 41-3-2(C) (1987); Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 120 N.M. 203, 211, 900 P.2d 952,
960 (1995).
105. See supranote 83 and accompanying text.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. The court's reliance on QualityChiropracticmay be risky. QualityChiropractic'slanguage questioning
"the premise on which the [Motto] Court reached this conclusion [that personal injury claims are assignable]" and
stating that the premise "appears incorrect" comes remarkably close to overruling Motto, a case decided by the New
Mexico Supreme Court. 2002-NMCA-080, 15, 51 P.3d 1172, 1178. Recasting Motto's declaration that New
Mexico allows for the assignment of personal injury claims as a narrow exception to the traditional rule barring
the practice amounts to a veiled departure from the constraints of stare decisis. See State ex rel. Martinez v. City
of Las Vegas, 2004-NMSC-009, 20, 89 P.3d 47, 54 (holding that the New Mexico Court of Appeals is bound by
stare decisis and therefore cannot decline to follow New Mexico Supreme Court precedent).
Interestingly, the New Mexico Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, despite the fact that the New
Mexico Court of Appeals has cited the Quality Chiropracticopinion twice for the proposition that the assignment
of personal injury claims is prohibited. See Espinosa v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co, 2006-NMCA-075, 1 19, 137
P.3d 631,637; Gulf Ins. Co. v. Cottone, 2006-NMCA- 150,1 28, 148 P.3d 814, 822. One wonders if this issue were
actually addressed by the New Mexico Supreme Court whether it might choose to return to Motto and jettison the
"antiquated doctrine of nonassignment of tortious actions." Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 129 Cal.Rptr. 271,
275 (Ct. App. 1976) (quoting John G. Fleming, The CollateralSource Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54
CAL.L. REv. 1478, 1479 (1966)).
109. See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 28, 148 P.3d 814, 822.
110. See Quality Chiropractic,2002-NMCA-080, 36, 51 P.3d at 1183.
111. See supranote 55.
112. See Quality Chiropractic,2002-NMCA-080, I 21-26,51 P.3d at 1179-81 (holding that subrogation
is permissible where assignment is not because subrogation (1) excludes "volunteers" and "strangers" to the
litigation, (2) places the risk on the insurer that the subrogor "will be unable to obtain compensation from the
tortfeasor," (3) "applies by necessity only to benefits paid directly for damages resulting from an injury-causing
accident," (4) is subject to equitable doctrines that allow the court to "protect the rights of the insured," (5) does
not increase the burden on the original tortfeasor, and (6) is subject to regulation through the Insurance Code).
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assignment in any proceeds from his claim.""' 3 Because of these distinctions, the
court declined to extend the Motto rule to the plaintiff.
Most of the cited differences between assignment and subrogation in Quality
Chiropracticwere not present in Cottone, where the plaintiff was an insurance
company." 4 In fact, Gulf's asserted right to subrogation based on an assignment was
closely analogous to the subrogation right that the Quality Chiropracticcourt
repeatedly endorsed." 5 Thus, because Gulf was an insurer seeking to take over
Rapp' s claims against the other drivers and not a medical provider seeking "a better
guarantee of payment,"' 16 the rationale for Quality Chiropractic'santi-assignment
rule was inapplicable to the facts of Cottone.
B. Subrogation
1. Pre-existing Duty
The Cottone court's focus on the absence of a pre-existing duty as a bar to Gulf s
subrogation claim is not without support in New Mexico case law." 7 However,
Cottone's lone citation for that premise is Quality Chiropractic."8 That case
focused on the distinction between assignment and subrogation when it articulated
the pre-existing duty rule." 9 According to the Quality Chiropracticcourt, the preexisting duty requirement makes subrogation to personal injury claims preferable
to the assignment of personal injury claims because a pre-existing duty keeps
"volunteers [from] choosing to become involved in litigation." 120 In contrast, an
assignee "inserts itself into the litigation," and it does so only after the assignor has
sustained an injury. 12' Thus, the rationale behind the pre-existing duty requirement
is to limit the universe of possible subrogees
to a particular claim by excluding
"volunteers" or "strangers" to the litigation. 122
While it is accurate to say in Cottone that Gulf did not owe a pre-existing duty
to Rapp to settle with her for the entirety of her claims, to maintain that Gulf was
a "volunteer" seems disingenuous. 23 In fact, out of the seven other drivers involved
in the collision, Gulf's insured was the only party whom Rapp chose to sue. 124 Thus,

113. ld. 22,51 P.3dat 1179.
114. See id. For example, one of the reasons the court allows subrogation but not assignments is that insurers
are experienced with litigation, so their joinder in subrogation claims does not burden the defendant. Id. 25, 51
P.3d at 1180. "he joinder of physicians and other creditors," however, would "increase the burden on tortfeasors

and their insurers in resolving such claims." Id. Given that Gulf is an insurer, this distinction is non-existent.
115.

Seeid.

21-26,51P.3dat 1179-81.

116. Id. T 22, 51 P.3d at 1179.
117. See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 9, 148 P.3d 814, 818 (citing Quality Chiropractic,
2002-NMCA-080, 21, 51 P.3d at 1179).
118. See Quality Chiropractic,2002-NMCA-080, 21, 51 P.3d at 1179 (stating that subrogation requires
a pre-existing duty while assignment does not).
1]9. Seeid.
120. Id. (also stating that "the doctrine of subrogation does not invite strangers to become unnecessarily

involved in litigation").
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.; see also HOLMES, supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 13, 148 P.3d 814, 819 (stating that Gulf's settling

of the whole of Rapp's claims was "by definition-a voluntary act on Gulfs part").
124.

See id. T 5, 148 P.3d at 817.
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Gulf was not a "stranger"' 125 who "insert[ed] itself into the litigation."'' 26 On the
contrary, Gulf was a party who Rapp dragged into the lawsuit. As a result, it is
arguable that the pre-existing duty requirement should not be applied to deny Gulf
s
127
subrogation rights because doing so would not serve the rationale of the rule.
Additionally, the Cottonecourt admitted that Gulf owed a "contractual duty.. .to
act in good faith in providing coverage to its insured" from the moment its insured
injured Rapp. 28 It is arguable that Rapp was an intended beneficiary of that duty.129
For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that under the Insurance
Code, 3 ° an automobile liability insurer owes a duty to exercise "fair settlement
practices" to a third party who is injured by its insured.' 3' Gulf, therefore, owed a
duty to Rapp to settle her claim against its insured in an "ethical" manner. 31 2 While
Gulf did not owe this duty to Rapp before she was injured by Gulf's insured, it did
owe an ethical duty to her before it settled her claim.'33 Thus, despite whether this
is the precise type of "pre-existing duty"' 3 4 that has traditionally supported subrogation, Gulf cannot be said to be a "stranger" or a "volunteer" to Rapp's causes of
action.'35 Because Gulf is not the type of party that the pre-existing duty requirement was intended to exclude, the Cottone court's reliance on that requirement
seems misplaced.' 36
2. New Mexico's System of Pure Comparative Negligence
The court's argument that Gulf attempted to make an end-run around New
Mexico's comparative fault system by asserting that it was subrogated to Rapp's
claims against the other drivers is also open to criticism.' The tried and true
rationales behind New Mexico's adoption of pure comparative negligence are
fairness to the parties and a belief that everyone should pay his fair share of the
injured party's damages. 138 Under either several liability or joint and several
liability, Gulf s attempt to settle the whole of Rapp' s damages and to subrogate to

125.

Quality Chiropractic, 2002-NMCA-080,

21, 51 P.3d at 1179.

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Cotone, 2006-NMCA-150, 11, 148 P.3d at 818.
129. See Hovet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-010,
17, 89 P.3d 69, 74 (holding that an injured third

party has a private right to sue a tortfeasor's automobile liability insurer for breach of the insurer's duty to exercise
fair settlement practices).
130. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 59A-16-20(e) (1997) ("[N]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt,

fair and equitable settlements of an insured's claims in which liability has become reasonably clear" is "defined
as [an] unfair and deceptive practice.").
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See Hovet, 2004-NMSC-010, 18, 89 P.3d at 75.
See id. 17, 89 P.3d at 74.
See id. 18, 89 P.3d at 74-75.
See Gulf Ins. Co. v. Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 10, 148 P.3d 814, 818.
See Quality Chiropractic, P.C. v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofAriz., 2002-NMCA-080,121,51 P.3d 1172, 1179.
See Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 10, 148 P.3d at 818.
See id. 13, 148 P.3d at 819.

138. See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 690, 634 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1981) (adopting pure comparative
negligence holding "[p]ure comparative negligence denies recovery for one's own fault; it permits recovery to the
extent of another's fault; and it holds all parties fully responsible for their own respective acts to the degree that

those acts have caused harm"); Bartlett v. N.M. Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 158, 646 P.2d 579, 585 (Ct.
App. 1982) (abolishing joint and several liability holding "[flaimess dictates that the blameworthiness of all actors
in an incident be treated on a consistent basis").

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38

her claims against the other drivers furthers these pivotal goals of pure comparative
negligence.' 39
First, allowing Gulf to subrogate to Rapp' s claims would further the goals of pure
comparative negligence if Gulf were severally liable with the other drivers. Out of
seven potential tortfeasors, Rapp chose to sue only Gulf's insured."4 Therefore, if
Gulf were barred from pursuing Rapp's claims against the other tortfeasors, they
would escape all liability for their negligent conduct and thus fail to pay their fair
share of Rapp's damages."'4 Because of Rapp's decision to sue only Gulf's insured,
the goals of New Mexico's system of pure comparative negligence would be
frustrated unless Gulf were allowed to subrogate to her claims against the other
drivers. 42
'
Alternatively, if Gulf werejointly and severally liable, 43
' its attempt to settle with
Rapp and to sue the other drivers for their fair share of her damages would also
comport with the goals of pure comparative negligence. Indeed, doing so would be
prescribed by statute. ' The Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act145
allows a joint tortfeasor who settles for more than his pro rata share with an injured
person to recover contribution from another tortfeasor as long as the non-settling
tortfeasor's liability is extinguished in the settlement. 46 Thus, had Gulf's insured
beenjointly and severally liable, the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors
Act would have effectively subrogated Gulf by law to Rapp's claims against the
other drivers when it settled the whole of her damages.
3. Structural Fault
The court's assertion that Gulf's actions were an attempt to return to the days of
joint and several liability raises a valid point. 47 Judge Bustamante's call for a
"demonstration of a structural fault in the system" 48 to justify deviating from New
Mexico's system of pure comparative negligence seems justified given the far1 49
reaching impacts of New Mexico's adoption of comparative negligence.

139. See supra note 138.
140. See Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 5, 148 P.3d at 817.
141. See supra note 138.
142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
143. Gulf argued in the alternative that it was jointly and severally liable with the other drivers under the
doctrine of successive tortfeasor liability. See Conone, 2006-NMCA-150, 19, 148 P.3d at 820 (citing Lujan v.
Healthsouth Rehab. Corp. 120 N.M. 422,426,902 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1995) (adopting successive torffeasor liability
in New Mexico)).
144. See infra note 145-46 and accompanying text.
145. NMSA 1978, § 41-3-1 through § 41-3-8.
146. See supra Part IRA.
147. See Cotone, 2006-NMCA-150, 12, 148 P.3d at 818-19 (referring to the practice of a party paying
for the entirety of a plaintiffs claim and then seeking contribution from the other tortfeasors).
148. Id. 13, 148 P.3d at 819.
149. The courts have used the adoption of comparative negligence as a justification for many subsequent
changes in New Mexico law. See, e.g., Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co., 1999-NMSC-029, 21, 987 P.2d 386, 395,
overruled on other grounds, Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 2003-NMSC-018, 73 P.3d 186 (holding that principles
of comparative fault deny the defendant the right to assert the affirmative defense of independent intervening cause
for the negligent actions of the plaintiff or of a third party).
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According to the court, Gulf did not make a compelling argument to justify a
departure from the norm of several liability. 5 '
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The situation presented in Cottone perhaps illustrates a "structural fault" of the
type called for by Judge Bustamante to justify departing from the default position
of several liability. The asymmetry in the law of several liability and joint and
several liability makes settling difficult for a plaintiff and a defendant who seek to
settle the whole of the plaintiff s damages. The existence of contribution forjointly
and severally liable defendants encourages and enables the parties to achieve this
goal. However, if the defendant is severally liable, he is unlikely to agree to pay for
the liability of all who are potentially liable because the ruling in Cottone demonstrates that he will be unable to sue the other tortfeasors for their fair share(s).
More complicated still is a situation where the nature of the defendant's liability
is in question and thus the general rule of several liability may not apply under the
specific facts of the case.1 51 In such a scenario, the comparative negligence system
creates an uncertainty that is problematic for both parties because neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant knows whetherj oint and several liability will apply until
a jury or a judge tells them so at the end of the lawsuit. The result is a system that
potentially stalls or precludes settlement negotiations until after a judgment is
rendered; this is problematic in a situation like Cottone because the defendant
cannot be certain of whether he will retain the right to recoup some of his losses
until it is too late. This situation calls for a solution.
A. Assignment of PersonalInjury Claims
Admittedly, most courts view the phrase "assignment of personal injury claims"
as something akin to a four-letter word.' 52 At the heart of this antipathy to the
practice is a wariness that the assignment device can be easily abused.'5 3 The
Quality Chiropracticcourt addressed this issue specifically, stating that "if accident
victims could use assignments as currency, they could issue assignments for any
purpose and in any amount."' 5 4 Without much effort, one can imagine a plaintiff
using the assignment device to fracture his single claim into a host of smaller
claims-each owned by a different party who is totally unrelated to the original
cause of action. " Additionally, one can easily conceive of an individual who seeks
an assignment in hopes of turning a profit. Perhaps the courts are wise to avoid the

150. See Cottone, 2006-NMCA-150, 13, 148 P.3d at 819. This issue will be addressed infra Part VII.
151. See supra notes 32-33.
152. Few states allow for the assignment of personal injury claims.
153. See Quality Chiropractic, P.C. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 2002-NMCA-080, 23, 51 P.3d 1172,
1179-80.
154. Id.
155. See id. The court cited Lewis v. Kubena, 800 So.2d 68, 72 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming the lower
court's refusal to allow an assignee to intervene in the plaintiff's personal injury lawsuit), as an example of the
types of problems courts confront when they recognize the assignment of personal injury claims.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38

additional burdens on the judiciary and on the original tortfeasor that could arise
from a wholesale recognition of the assignment of personal injury claims. 156
However, a narrow common-law exception could limit the potential impact of a
rule that allowed for the assignment of personal injury claims. Such an exception
could be tailored by the courts to address the concerns raised above. First, the right
of assignment could be limited to parties who were potentially liable for the
plaintiff's injuries. Second, the law could impose a cap on the assignee's recovery
so that it could not exceed the amount that he paid in consideration for the
assignment. This type of exception to the anti-assignment rule would serve the
needs of parties like Gulf and Rapp and would be narrow enough to guard against
the dangers of a general acceptance of the assignments of personal injury claims.
Admittedly though, any such exception is susceptible to a "slippery slope"
argument.5 7 With the court's reluctance to allow for any assignment of personal
injury claims,' 58 it is wise to look for a non-assignment alternative.
B. Subrogation
To allow Gulf to subrogate to the claims of a third party like Rapp would not
represent a significant departure from the law of subrogation in New Mexico.' 59
Indeed, subrogation to Rapp' s claims may be a better legal fit for this scenario than
assignment.
Inthis context the doctrines of assignment and subrogation are different in name
but virtually indistinguishable in effect. " Subrogation, however, poses an attractive
alternative to assignment for several reasons. First, instead of being based in
contract, subrogation arises out of equity. 6 ' Therefore, although subrogation
frequently occurs in the context of an insurance contract, the insurer's right of
subrogation is not triggered by the contract. Instead, the right "isfounded upon the
relationship of the parties and upon equitable principles, for the purpose of
accomplishing the substantial ends of justice."'6 2 Thus, once an insurer pays its
insured for "the debt of another," the court, acting
in equity, "assign[s the insurer]
' 63
the rights and remedies of the original creditor."'
Accordingly, New Mexico courts have noted that a benefit of subrogation's
equitable roots is the court's ability to "apply equitable doctrines in subrogation
156. In addition to attempts to intervene, it is arguable that assignees could be made indispensable parties
as in subrogation claims. See Quality Chiropractic, P.C. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 2002-NMCA-080, 1 25, 51
P.3d 1172, 1180.
157. See id.

23, 51 P.3d at 1180 (rejecting a narrow exception to the anti-assignment rule for medical

services stating that there would be "no legitimate basis on which to make such a distinction").
158. See id.
159. See supra Part Il.C.
160. See Kahrs v. Sanchez, 1998-NMCA-037, '1 25, 956 P.2d 132, 136-37(1998) (citing 73 AM. JuR. 2D
Subrogation § 4 (1974)) (stating "that regardless of whether a transfer is technically called assignment or
subrogation.. .its ultimate effect is the same: to pass the title to a cause of action from one person to another").
161. See U.S. Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Raton Natural Gas Co., 86 N.M. 160, 162, 521 P.2d 122, 124 (1974)
("A distinction is sometimes made between legal and conventional subrogation. Legal subrogation arises by
operation of law; conventional subrogation arises by convention or contract of the parties. Whether legal or
conventional, subrogation is an equitable remedy.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. id. at 162, 521 P.2d at 124-25 (quoting 6A APPLEMAN, INSuRANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4054 at
142-44).
163. Id. at 162, 521 P.2d at 124.
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cases to protect the rights of the insured."'" Specifically, the court can reduce a
subrogee's recovery through equitable apportionment' 65 and can require that
subrogated insurers pay a portion of attorney's fees. 16 6 Thus, if subrogation were
expanded to cover a situation like that in Cottone, the court would be free to limit
the insurer's recovery to a fair and just amount. As a result, any argument that
expanding the right of subrogation, however slightly, would lead to greedy
insurance companies seeking to take advantage of unsophisticated plaintiffs could
easily be countered by the court's ability to exercise its equitable powers to limit
recovery.
The second reason why subrogation may be preferable to assignment in this
context is that subrogation to personal injury claims is already a common practice,
while the assignment of personal injury claims remains forbidden.' 67 In Quality
Chiropractic,Judge Pickard gave a laundry list of reasons why subrogation to
personal injury claims is permissible while the assignment of personal injury claims
is not.' 68 Insurers are allowed to subrogate to the claims of their insureds once they
pay out benefits. Slightly expanding the universe of possible subrogees to include
an insurer-acting on its duty to exercise "fair settlement practices" -that pays
benefits to a third party injured by its insured would not represent a significant
change in the law or result in a dramatic increase in the number of subrogated
claims before the courts. After all, it is difficult to imagine that an insurance
company would often be eager to settle for more than its fair share of a plaintiff's
injury on the off chance that it might be able to recoup some of its losses. One
would think that an insurer would only take such a risk in the rare circumstances
described in Cottone.
VII. CONCLUSION
Cottone stands for the proposition that a plaintiff and a defendant like Rapp and
Gulf, who wish to settle for the whole of the plaintiff's damages, are left without
a solution if the defendant is severally liable. In such a situation, the law's current
inability to effectuate the parties' wishes, by providing an incentive to the defendant
to settle the plaintiffs entire claim, illustrates a fundamental problem with New
Mexico's system of pure comparative negligence.
Several compelling reasons support recovery for a party in Gulf s position, and
there are at least two possible avenues the court could take to accomplish that end.
While the wholesale assignment of personal injury claims is arguably not in the best

164. Quality Chiropractic, P.C. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 2002-NMCA-080,

24, 51 P.3d at 1180.

165. See id. (citing White v. Sutherland, 92 N.M. 187, 192,585 P.2d 331, 336 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that
court could reduce insurer's award when insured settled for less than the full amount of her damages)).

166. See id. (citing Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 120 N.M. 523,528-29,903 P.2d 834,839-40 (1995)).
167. See id.
168. See id. 9121-26,51 P.3d at 1179-81 (holding that subrogation is permissible where assignment is not

because subrogation (1) excludes "volunteers" and "strangers" to the litigation, (2) places the risk on the insurer
that the subrogor "will be unable to obtain compensation from the tortfeasor," (3) "applies by necessity only to
benefits paid directly for damages resulting from an injury-causing accident," (4) is subject to equitable doctrines
that allow the court to "protect the rights of the insured," (5) does not increase the burden on the original tortfeasor,
and (6) is subject to regulation through the Insurance Code.)
169. See supra note 129.
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interests of the parties or the courts, a narrowly tailored exception to the antiassignment rule provides a possible solution.'
The equitable doctrine of
subrogation, however, poses a more promising vehicle to effectuate the goals of
parties like Gulf and Rapp because it would employ an already accepted remedy to
address the problem.
The asymmetry between the law of several liability and joint and several liability
would be eliminated if Gulf were allowed to compensate Rapp fully for her injuries
and then "step into [her] shoes" '' and sue the other tortfeasors. If nothing else, this
arrangement would allow the inexperienced plaintiff the opportunity to cede the
litigation process to the more able insurance company. Beyond that, though, Rapp
would ostensibly be satisfied with her settlement, and Gulf would be allowed to
recoup some of its losses while fulfilling the goals of the comparative negligence
system by holding the other tortfeasors responsible for their fair share(s) of Rapp's
damages.

170. See supra Part VLA.
171. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 120 N.M. 523, 527, 903 P.2d 834, 838 (1995).

